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ELIMINATION OF THE AGENCY FICTION
IN THE VICARIOUS ADMISSIONS
EXCEPTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Washington Judicial Council has recommended that
the State Supreme Court adopt most of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, it has proposed retention of the common law version of the vi-
carious admissions exception as presently applied by the Washington
courts.' Washington's adoption of Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(D) would
involve a significant departure from established precedent2 but would
be consistent with a widely noted modern trend toward liberalizing re-
strictions on admissions by agents.3 Since the Judicial Council's pro-
posal was contrary to this trend and was rationalized only by the cryp-
tic statement that existing Washington law "reflected better policy," 4
a more detailed analysis of the vicarious admissions exception seems
appropriate.
This note will compare the Washington courts' application of the
common law vicarious admissions exception to the broad rule embo-
died in Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Furthermore, it will identify and
analyze the policies upon which the vicarious admissions rule is
grounded and will compare the effectiveness of the common law rule
and the federal or "broad" rule in fulfilling those policies. It will dem-
onstrate how, in focusing on the substantive law of agency rather than
directly on those circumstances which tend to assure a statement's
trustworthiness, both rules share a fundamental flaw and, as a result,
1. PROPOSED WASH. R. EVID. 801, Comment 801, Paragraph (d).
2. See Parts II and III infra (comparison of Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(D) and the com-
mon law vicarious admissions exception as currently applied in Washington).
3. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D), Advisory Comm. Note; 4 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)(D) [01](1977) [hereinafter cited as WEIN-
STEIN]. See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 267, at 641 (2d
ed. E. Cleary 1972); 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1078 (Chadbourn rev. 1972); Falknor,
Vicarious Admissions and the Uniform Rules, 14 VAND. L. REV. 855 (1961); Hetland,
Admissions in the Uniform Rules. Are They Necessary?, 46 IOWA L. REv. 307 (1961);
Boyce, Rule 63(9)(a) of Uniform Rules of Evidence-A Vector Analysis, 5 UTAH L.
REv. 311 (1957), in which the authors, writing before the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, discuss this trend as reflected by Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(9)(a) (1953
version) and Model Code of Evidence rule 508(a) (1942), both of which are substantially
identical to Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(D).
4. PROPOSED WASH. R. EVID. 801, Comment 801, Paragraph (d).
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accomplish only imprecisely the basic purpose of admitting the maxi-
mum amount of reliable evidence. Finally, this note will suggest a
third formulation of the rule which inquires directly into the against-
interest nature of an agent's admission, the feature most commonly
emphasized as the basis of such statements' reliability.
II. THE OPERATION OF WASHINGTON'S PRESENT
VICARIOUS ADMISSIONS EXCEPTION
The Washington courts have generally applied the common law vi-
carious admissions exception called the "speaking agent" test.5 Under
this test, an agent's out-of-court statements are admissible against his
principal at trial only "if the agent was authorized to make the state-
ment or was authorized to make, on the principal's behalf, any state-
ments concerning the subject matter."6 The "speaking agent" test
primarily focuses on whether the declarant was authorized to make
the statement which the principal's adversary is trying to introduce.
Under some circumstances, authority to do an act includes the au-
thority to make statements about the act. Under others, it does not.7
For example, the employment contract of a supermarket manager
may not expressly authorize her to explain to an injured customer that
5. In early decisions, the Washington Supreme Court mixed elements of agency and
res gestae in determining the admissibility against the principle of the out-of-court state-
ments of an agent. See, e.g., Tacoma & E. Lumber Co. v. Field & Co., 100 Wash. 79, 86,
170 P. 360, 362 (1918); Cook v. Stimson Mill Co., 36 Wash. 36, 39, 78 P. 39. 40 (1904);
Moran Bros. Co. v. Snoqualmie Falls Power Co., 29 Wash. 292, 305, 69 P. 759, 764
(1902). In more recent cases, the court has confined its inquiry to the agency relation-
ship. See, e.g., Kadiak Fisheries Co. v. Murphy Diesel Co., 70 Wn. 2d 153, 163, 442
P.2d 496. 502 (1967); Hartman v. Port of Seattle, 63 Wn. 2d 879, 885, 389 P. 2d 669,
673 (1964); Griffiths v. Big Bear Stores, Inc., 55 Wn. 2d 243, 247, 347 P.2d 532, 535
(1959).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 286 (1958). The Washington Supreme
Court has quoted this section, indicating its accurate expression of Washington law.
Hartman v. Port of Seattle, 63 Wn. 2d 879, 885, 389 P.2d 669, 673 (1964).
The Washington Judicial Council's proposed Rule 801(d)(2)(D) was drafted to em-
body current Washington law. PROPOSED WASH. R. EVID. 801, Comment 801, Paragraph
(d). The proposed rule reads: "A statement is not hearsay if ... the statement is offered
against a party and is ... a statement by his agent or servant acting within the scope of
his authority to make the statement for the party." PROPOSED WASH. R. EVID. 801.
7. See notes 8-15 and accompanying text infra (discussion of when, under the
"speaking agent" rule, the Washington courts are willing to infer the authority to speak
from the authority to act).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 288(2) (1958) reads: "Authority to do an act or
to conduct a transaction does not of itself include authority to make statements con-
cerning the act or transaction." Id.
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the cause of the customer's fall was water on the store's floor.8 How-
ever, in performing those duties with which she is expressly charged,
the manager must inevitably speak with the store's customers about
problems which arise in the store. Thus, the store manager would be
considered a "speaking agent," and despite her lack of express author-
ity, her statements would be admissible against her principal (presum-
ably the store owner) in an action brought by the injured customer. A
janitor whose sole responsibility was mopping the floor, however,
would probably be found to be a "non-speaking agent." His state-
ments, if made long enough after the event not to qualify as spontane-
ous utterances, 9 would be inadmissible against the owner even if they
related to the condition of the floor, a matter clearly within the scope
of the janitor's responsibility.
Disagreement about the application of the "speaking agent" rule
typically arises when the court must determine whether a declarant
has implied authority to speak on behalf of the principal.' 0 The
Washington courts' willingness to find implied speaking authority has
been somewhat unpredictable. In Kadiak Fisheries Co. v. Murphy
Diesel Co.," the court found that an employee, charged with main-
taining his employer's fishing vessels and reporting to his superiors on
the vessels' condition, lacked the authority to make statements about
the vessels to persons who were not fellow employees. The court dis-
tinguished Hartman v. Port of Seattle,'2 an earlier Washington case,
in which a field engineer was found to have authority to make state-
ments concerning the cause of an accident largely because of his
responsibility for making accident reports and for conferring with
8. This hypothetical is based on the factual situation in Griffiths v. Big Bear Stores,
Inc., 55 Wn. 2d 243, 347 P.2d 532 (1959), which is one of the Washington Supreme
Court's more recent treatments of the vicarious admissions exception. The court held
that the supermarket manager was a "speaking agent" whose out-of-court statements
were admissible against the store owner. Id. at 247, 347 P.2d at 535.
9. Under current Washington law, retention of which was proposed by the Washing-
ton Judicial Council, PROPOSED WASH. R. EvID. 803(1)-(2), out-of-court statements
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or made under the stress of excite-
ment caused by the event are admissible despite their hearsay nature. Beck v. Dye, 200
Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113 (1939).
10. Controversy seldom arises when the declarant was expressly authorized by the
party to make a statement on the party's behalf. The comment to Federal Rule
801(d)(2)(C) states: "No authority is required for the general proposition that a state-
ment authorized by a party to be made should have the status of an admission by the
party." FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(C), Advisory Comm. Note. See also MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE rule 507, comment a, at 247 (1942).
11. 70Wn. 2d 153, 442 P.2d 496 (1967).
12. 63 Wn. 2d 879, 389 P.2d 669 (1964).
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other persons working on the project. The ground for the distinction
was the amount of authority delegated to the agent. 13 The court in
Hartman, however, cited with approval an early Washington case14 in
which the court inferred speaking authority from a cannery foreman's
responsibility for overseeing the operation of the cannery's ma-
chinery.
In these three cases, the factors examined in determining the exis-
tence of speaking authority included the degree to which the principal
relied on the judgment of the agent, the extent of the agent's expertise
on the subject about which he had made the statement, and the types
of reports the agent was expressly authorized to make.' 5 These cases
typify the circumstances to which the "speaking agent" test has been
applied and illustrate the difficulty of predicting, even after identify-
ing the relevant elements of inquiry, whether the court will find an
implied authority to speak.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION OF THE
BROAD RULE
The impetus to expand the vicarious admissions rule came from a
growing dissatisfaction by various courts and scholarly authorities
with the exclusion of many apparently reliable statements by non-
speaking agents. 16 For example, had the janitor described in Part II
told the injured customer that there was water on the floor where the
customer had fallen, the statement would be inadmissible under the
common law rule despite the existence of certain circumstances which
tend to produce reliability.1 7 Some courts began to admit these types
of statements by liberally inferring speaking authority, while others
abandoned the speaking agent requirement outright. 18
13. 70 Wn. 2d at 163, 442 P.2d at 503 (1967).
14. Lee Hong v. Schoenwald, 86 Wash. 326, 150 P. 436 (1915).
15. For a more detailed discussion of the factors relevant in determining speaking
authority see Comment, Admissions of Agents, 40 Mo. L. REV. 55, 63-69 (1975); Note,
Negligence at Work: Employee Admissions in California and Federal Courts, 9 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 89, 95 (1976).
16. See cases and commentary cited in FED. R. EvlD. 801(d)(2)(D), Advisory
Comm. Note: 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 3. 801(d)(2)(D) [01], at 801- 134(1977).
17. See Parts IV-C and V-C infra (discussion of the circumstances which tend to
make vicarious admissions reliable).
18. For a thorough discussion of the frustration of various courts with the narrow-
ness of the "speaking agent" rule and their various means of admitting reliable state-
ments in spite of the rule, see Harvey, Evidence Code Section 1224-Are an Em-
ployee's Admissions Admissible Against His Employer?, 8 SANTA CLARA LAW.
59, 61-68 (1967).
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Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(D) reads: "A statement is not hearsay if...
[t] he statement is offered against a party and is... a statement by his
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship." This rule
eliminates entirely the requirement of the agent's speaking author-
ity.19 The court need examine the scope of agency only to determine
whether the statement concerned a matter within the scope of the de-
clarant's responsibility. 20 Admissible under this rule are those state-
ments previously excluded because of the agent's lack of authority to
speak on behalf of his principal. For example, the janitor's
explanation to the injured customer about the cause of her fall would
be admissible against the store owner, under the broad rule, because it
concerned the condition of the floor, a matter within the scope of the
janitor's employment. 21
The broad rule, in substantially the same form as the present Fed-
eral Rule, was first promulgated by the drafters of the Model Code of
Evidence.2 2 The Model Rule was adopted verbatim in the Uniform
Rules of Evidence enacted in two states. 23
The Washington Judicial Council is not alone in resisting the trend
toward adopting the broad rule. The California Law Revision Com-
mittee recommended adoption of a broad vicarious admissions rule
19. The effect of the broad rule has also been described as the conclusive presump-
tion that the authority to act implies the authority to speak about those acts. Falknor, su-
pra note 3, at 856.
20. The only foundational requirements for Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(D) are that the
statement concern a matter within the scope of the agency and that it be made prior to
the agency's termination. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D). Whether the agent must have spo-
ken from personal knowledge or been competent as a witness at the time the statement
was made has not been conclusively determined. See Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 1069 (1957).
The primary focus of this note, however, is the agency element of the foundation, and
the analysis of these other possible requirements is beyond the scope of this note.
21. An especially illustrative example of an agent's statement the admissibility of
which turned on the court's willingness to apply the broad rule is Rudzinski v. Warner
Theatres, Inc., 16 Wis. 2d 241, 114 N.W.2d 466 (1962), in which the majority applied
the common law rule to exclude an usher's admission about the cause of a customer's
fall in a theater lobby. A concurring judge argued for the adoption of the broad rule, ap-
plication of which would have allowed the statement since, regardless of the usher's im-
plied authority to make statements on behalf of his principal, the statement clearly re-
lated to a matter within the scope of the usher's authority. 114 N.W.2d at 470 (Gordon,
J., concurring).
22. Model Code of Evidence rule 508(a) (1942) reads:
Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible against a party to the action if the
judge finds that . . . the declaration concerned a matter within the scope of an
agency or employment of the declarant for the party and was made before the ter-
mination of the agency or employment.
Id.
23. KAN. CODE C.P. § 60-460(i)(1976); NJ.R. EvID. 63(9)(1973).
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but withdrew its proposal after receiving comments from the Califor-
nia bar expressing doubts about the guarantees of trustworthiness un-
der such a rule.24
There is general agreement that the common law rule excludes
many statements which are clearly reliable, but even proponents of
the broad rule concede that the elimination of the "speaking agent"
requirement admits some unreliable statements as well.2 5 Neither rule
accomplishes with much precision the basic goal of admitting the
maximum amount of reliable evidence. 26 The disagreement about the
comparative merits of the two rules seems to be based on differing
judgments of whether the reliable statements by "non-speaking
agents" admitted under the broad rule are of sufficient value to justify
the admission of the unreliable statements which the broad rule also
allows.
IV. THE RATIONALES UNDERLYING THE VICARIOUS
ADMISSIONS EXCEPTION
Three distinct rationales underlying the vicarious admissions ex-
ception have been identified. This exception, like the admissions ex-
ception generally, has been characterized as a natural attribute of the
adversary system. The exception has been justified by its consistency
with the substantive law of agency, and it also has been described as
affording circumstantial guarantees of a statement's trustworthiness.
It is important to weigh the underlying rationales behind the two
rules.
24. Harvey, supra note 18, at 67; Note, supra note 15, at 115. See also Note, Ad-
inissibility of an Agent's Declarations Against His Employer Under Evidence Code
Section 1224, 19 HAST. L. J. 1395 (1968). The fairness of eliminating the speaking agent
requirement is discussed in the text accompanying note 51 infra.
25. See Boyce, supra note 3, at 324, for a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses
of the broad rule by a proponent. The author notes that opponents of the broad rule
"deny that under modern conditions of unionized employee groups the employer has a
real and effective economic control through his right to discharge, and they further deny
that the unity of interest between employer and employee is sufficient to insure respect
for the employer's interests." Id. See also Report, New Jersey Supreme Court, Commit-
tee on Evidence 165-67 (1963), reprinted in 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 3,
801(d)(2)(D) [01], at 801-139 (1977), in which the Committee concludes its endorse-
ment of the broad rule: "[W] hile there is some danger here of manufactured evidence,
the Rule reflects the view that this would seldom occur and that the greater vice by far is
the exclusion of valuable evidence." Id.
26. See the Advisory Committee's Introductory Note to Article VIII of the Federal
Rules of Evidence for a discussion of the practical need to balance the need for evidence
against the desire to assure complete trustworthiness.
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A. The Vicarious Admissions Exception as a Fair and Natural
Attribute of the Adversary System
The traditional rationale, and that advanced in the comments to
the Federal Rules,27 is that the admissions exception is a natural inci-
dent of the adversary system.28 The comments make clear that
trustworthiness plays no part in this rationale. Hence, none of the or-
dinary guarantees of trustworthiness is required.29 The rule allowing
into evidence a party's own out-of-court inconsistent statements pre-
dates the development of the hearsay rule30 and is based more on an
intuitive sense of fairness than on any current theory of evidence
law.3 1 This underlying notion of the self-evident fairness of the admis-
sions exception is exemplified by Professor Morgan's early discussion
of the exception:
[1] t is too obvious for comment that the party whose declarations are
offered against him is in no position to object on the score of lack of
confrontation or of lack of opportunity for cross-examination. It
seems quite as clear that he ought not to be heard to complain that he
was not under oath. 32
The fairness of the admissions exception in many instances ceases
to be self-evident when the out-of-court statements admitted were
made not by the party but by the party's agent. For example, in the
supermarket hypothetical, had the store owner herself informed the
injured customer about the water on the floor, the owner would be in
no position to object to the introduction of her own statement at trial.
The owner "ought not to be heard to complain" that her own out-of-
court statements were so unreliable as to be inadmissible. Even if a
27. Because the admissibility of a party's admissions is not based on any inherent
guarantee of trustworthiness but is an incident to the adversary system, Rule 801(d)(2)
defines admissions as non-hearsay, rather than as a hearsay exception. FED. R. EvID.
801 (d)(2), Advisory Comm. Note.
28. Falknor, supra note 3, at 864.
29. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2), Advisory Comm. Note. Professor Hetland earlier ob-
served: "Hearsay exceptions, other than admissions, can be said in varying degrees to
have some rational basis for assuming a probability of truth for admissions." Hetland,
supra note 3, at 309.
30. Morgan, Admissions, 12 WASH. L. REv. 181, 182 (1937).
31. In discussing the policy basis for vicarious admissions, Dean McCormick com-
mented: "This notion that it does not lie in the opponent's mouth to question the
trustworthiness of his own declarations is an emotion so universal that it may stand for a
reason." C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 239, at 503 (1st ed.
1954). See also Hetland, supra note 3, at 309; 43 HARv. L. REV. 936, 940 (1930).
32. Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L. J. 355,
361 (1921) (emphasis added).
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witness testified incorrectly about the owner's statement, the owner
would have the opportunity to take the stand and explain. However,
were the out-of-court statement of either the manager or the janitor
sought to be introduced against the owner, the latter might very well
have no idea why the statement was made, and thus her opportunity
to explain on the stand would not be a reasonable substitute for the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 33
Despite the distortion of the fairness rationale which results from
extending it to statements by agents, this rationale has nonetheless
been advanced as support for the vicarious admissions exception. 34
B. Consistency of the Vicarious Admissions Exception with
Substantive Vicarious Liability
Another rationale for the vicarious admissions exception, although
related to the nature of the adversary system, evolves more directly
from the interaction of vicarious admissions and the substantive doc-
trine of vicarious liability. The basis for this rationale is a nondoctri-
nal emphasis on consistency, illustrated by Dean Wigmore's observa-
tions:
[I] t is absurd to hold that the superintendent has power to make the
employer heavily liable by mismanaging the whole factory, but not to
make statements about his mismanagement which can be even listened
to in court; the pedantic unpracticalness of this rule as now universally
administered makes a laughingstock of court methods. 35
33. See 43 HARV. L. REV. 936, 940 (1930).
34. The fairness of using the statements of an agent against her principal has been
rationalized by the notion that the principal's opportunity to take the stand to explain
her agent's statements is a reasonable substitute for the opportunity to cross-examine. 4
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048, at 5 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). The difficulty with this anal-
ysis is that in many circumstances the agency will have been terminated by the time of
trial, and the principal will not know why the agent made the statement she did. See C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 267, at 641; Comment, Hearsay Evidence and the Federal
Rules: Article VIII-Mapping Out the Borders of Hearsay, 36 LA. L. REV. 139, 155(1975). See also Note, supra note 15, at 89 (1976), in which it is observed:
The reasoning behind the admissions exception is not wholly applicable to vicari-
ous admissions, since the employer is now being required to accept or explain in-
consistencies created by someone else. If the employee has said something that con-
tradicts the employer's position in court, the employer might well want to cross-
examine the speaker in an attempt to discredit the statement.
Id. at 92.
35. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1078 n.2, at 166 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). Wigmore
employed analogous reasoning to justify the common law exception for joint obligors.
He phrased the principle "the greater may here be said to include the less." 2 J. WI-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 1077 (2d ed. 1923).
104
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The difficulty with this justification for the vicarious admissions
rule is that it ignores the difference between the policies of the law of
evidence and the law of vicarious liability.36 Under the substantive
law of agency, a certain degree of unfairness in holding principals li-
able for the wrongful acts of their agents may be outweighed by a ba-
sic societal judgment about the propriety of holding liable the person
who derives the most benefit from the activity which gave rise to lia-
bility and who is usually best able to bear the loss and prevent future
accidents.37 The focus of evidence law, however, is not loss
distribution but accuracy in fact-finding. Thus, logic does not compel
modeling evidentiary rules after the rules of substantive law. What
Wigmore noted as the absurdity of imputing to a principal the negli-
gence of the agent but not the admissions of the agent may not be a
logical absurdity after all, but rather the absurdity which in practice
results from the interaction of substantive and evidentiary rules.38
In the supermarket example, had the customer's fall been due to
the negligence of the janitor, the customer could sue the owner alone,
on the basis of respondeat superior, or she could join both the owner
and the janitor in the same action.39 Under present Washington law,
the janitor's statement would be admissible against himself as a per-
sonal admission,40 but it would not be admissible against the owner
because the janitor was not authorized to speak for the owner.41 Thus,
the owner would be entitled to a limiting instruction whereby the jury
could consider the janitor's out-of-court statement only against the
janitor and not against the owner. However, were the janitor's negli-
gence established on the basis of his own admission, liability would be
imputed to the owner as a matter of law.42 The purpose of the limiting
instruction, based on evidence law, would thus be circumvented by
36. Morgan criticized Wigmore's use of the logic that "the greater includes the less,"
see note 35 supra, pointing out that substantive rules and evidentiary rules may be de-
rived from different policies and thus be different in kind. Morgan, The Rationale of Vi-
carious Admissions, 42 HARV. L. REV. 461, 470 (1929).
37. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (4th ed. 1971).
38. For a detailed discussion of the inherent inconsistency of the common law vi-
carious admissions rule and the substantive rule of vicarious liability see Harvey, supra
note 18. See also 52 TEX. L. REV. 593 (1974).
39. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be liable for the
tortious conduct of her employee regardless of the employer's personal fault. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
40. 5 R. MEISENHOLDER, WASHINGTON PRACTICE § 306 (1965 &Supp.).
41. See Part II supra (discussion of operation of Washington vicarious admissions
rule).
42. WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS WPI 50.01 (1967).
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the final jury instruction, based on the substantive law of vicarious li-
ability.
C. The Vicarious Admissions Exception as Guaranteeing
Trustworthiness
Although the comments to the Federal Rules identify the nature of
the adversary system as the only rationale for the vicarious admissions
exception, 43 many authorities, and especially those endorsing the
broad rule, emphasize trustworthiness as the principal justification for
the exception. 44 Two guarantees of trustworthiness are most com-
monly advanced. First, the statement, at the time it was made, was
usually against the principal's interest, and the agent, out of a sense of
loyalty or fear of discharge, would not make a statement against her
principal's interest unless it were true.45 Second, the agent could rea-
sonably be expected to have more than average familiarity with the
subject about which he spoke, and his perception could thus reason-
ably be expected to be more accurate than the statement of an ordi-
nary observer. 46 The admissions exception, of course, requires the
presence of none of these circumstances, 47 but the rationale is based
on the assumption that they will tend to be present if the agency rela-
tionship existed at the time the statement was made.48
For instance, the rationale assumes that the store manager and the
janitor feel an identity of interest with the owner and fear that a state-
ment exposing the owner to civil liability might jeopardize their jobs.
The presumed mixture of loyalty to employer and fear of discharge
would tend to make an agent perceive a statement against his em-
43. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2), Advisory Comm. Note.
44. The Model Code shifted the theory underlying vicarious admissions from the
employer's self-contradiction to the trustworthiness of the statement. Harvey. supra
note 18, at 68. The comments to the Model Code justify the adoption of the broad vicari-
ous admissions rule by the simple assertion that "the agent or servant in speaking about
the transaction which it was within his authority to perform is likely to be telling the
truth in most instances." MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508, comment, at 251 (1942).
See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 267, at 641; Boyce, supra note 3, at 323.
45. C. MCCORMICK, .supra note 3, § 267, at 641.
46. Id.
47. See note 29 supra.
48. See, e.g., Report, New Jersey Supreme Court, Committee on Evidence 165-67
(1963), reprinted in 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 3. 801(d)(2)(D)[01], at 801-138 to 801-
139 (1977), in which the committee reporter observed that the broad rule assures relia-
bility because " [o] rdinarily employees do not jeopardize their jobs by making false
statements which are costly to their employers." Id.
106
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ployer's interest also to be against his own interest, and it is this
against-interest quality which is advanced as the primary guarantee of
the statement's trustworthiness.49
V. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BROAD RULE IN
SATISFYING THE RATIONALES OF FAIRNESS,
CONSISTENCY, AND TRUSTWORTHINESS
The broad rule must be assessed in light of the policies underlying
the admissions exception to determine whether simply eliminating the
common law speaking agent requirement is the best way to admit
those reliable statements by "non-speaking agents" which are pres-
ently excluded in Washington.
A. The Broad Rule's Furtherance of the Fairness Rationale
The more distant the principal-agent relationship, the less fair the
assumption that the principal and the agent share the same interest
and that the principal "ought not be heard to complain" about her
lack of opportunity to cross-examine her agent.50 In many cases the
practical effect of the federal rule is to admit against the principal
statements of an agent whom the principal has entrusted with very lit-
tle authority. That this extension strains to the breaking point the fair-
ness rationale is illustrated by Professor Falknor's objection to the
broad vicarious admissions rule of the Model and Uniform Codes:
"Ought I not have the right to employ an experienced and skillful
49. See, e.g., Rudzinski v. Warner Theaters, Inc., 16 Wis. 2d 241, 114 N.W.2d 466
(1962) discussed briefly at note 21 supra, in which the concurring judge, in proposing
adoption of the broad rule, stated:
The raison d'etre for [the admission-against-interest] exception to the hearsay rule
is that trustworthiness surrounds admissions against interest. The same considera-
tions which give credibility to the statement against interest on the part of a princi-
pal should apply to his employee. Loyalty to an employer's interests is the rule,
rather than the exception.
114 N.W.2d at 471. Professor Hetland has suggested that a statement exposing one's
principal to legal liability is sufficiently adverse to one's pecuniary interest in a job to
allow it to fall within the declaration-against-interest exception. Hetland, supra note 3,
at 328.
50. It seems reasonable to suppose, for example, that a factory owner would be less
able to explain the statements of an assembly line worker than the statements of the fac-
tory's superintendent. When a principal is far removed from her agent, the principal's
opportunity to testify is scarcely a fair substitute for the opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant.
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truck driver, who may at the same time be a careless, unreliable and
erratic talker, without being subject to having used against me his cas-
ual utterances made long after an accident?" 5 '
The fairness rationale under the common law rule is weakened by
the courts' willingness to infer speaking authority liberally.5 2 Never-
theless, retention of the "speaking agent" requirement would further
this rationale to some extent by admitting statements by only those
agents whom the principal probably selected with some awareness of
their likelihood to speak about their job responsibilities. For example,
a store owner might reasonably be expected to take into account,
when hiring a manager, the prospective employee's ability to commu-
nicate with the customers. The owner would be less likely to consider
such a qualification when hiring a janitor.
B. The Broad Rule's Furtherance of Consistency Between
Vicarious Admissions and Vicarious Liability
Adoption of the broad rule would substantially lessen, if not elimi-
nate, the conflict between the substantive rule of vicarious liability
and the evidentiary rule of vicarious admissions. The broad rule ad-
mits statements Which concern matters within the scope of the agent's
authority.53 Since the principal may be held vicariously liable only for
the agent's authorized acts,5 4 it is difficult to conceive of a statement
by an agent which would be relevant to establishing the principal's vi-
carious liability and yet not concern a matter within the scope of the
agent's authority. It has been argued that the resolution of this con-
flict is, in itself, sufficient justification for adoption of the broad rule,
since a judicial determination of a principal's liability should not
depend on such trial tactics as joining the agent as a party defen-
dant.55
51. Falknor, supra note 3. at 856.
52. See note 18 supra.
53. See text preceding note 19 supra (language of Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(D)).
54. E.g., Roletto v. Department Stores Garage Co., 30 Wn. 2d 439, 191 P.2d 875
(1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1957).
55. Harvey, supra note 18.
The Model Code resolved the inconsistency by making a statement admissible when
"one of the issues between the party and the proponent of the evidence is a legal liability
of the declarant. and the matter declared tends to establish that liability." MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE rule 508(d) (1942). The Federal Rules did not, however, incorporate this
limitation. See 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 3, 801(d)(2)(D)[01], at 801-140 (1977).
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C. The Broad Rule's Furtherance of the Trustworthiness Rationale
The elimination of the "speaking agent" requirement would allow
admission of statements by agents who might feel little pressure to tell
the truth. An agent's loyalty to her principal and her desire to keep
her job, the primary sources of trustworthiness, 56 would seem less
likely to be influential when the agent has no authority to speak on
behalf of the principal. The store manager, with whom the owner has
entrusted substantial authority, could reasonably be expected to iden-
tify more closely with the owner's interests than could the janitor, who
may never even have seen the owner.57
VI. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF ADOPTING THE
WASHINGTON JUDICIAL COUNCIL'S PROPOSAL
Were the Washington Supreme Court to adopt the recommenda-
tions of the Washington Judicial Council,58 including retention of the
common law vicarious admissions rule, much of the reliable evidence
excluded under the common law rule would be admissible under the
liberalized statements-against-interest hearsay exception. 59 Under this
exception, any statement by an agent which exposed the agent him-
self, as well as the principal, to civil or criminal liability would be ad-
56. See Part IV-Csupra.
57. Since courts typically find that persons involved in management have speaking
authority, see Part II supra (discussion of criteria for speaking authority), it could be
argued that elimination of the speaking authority requirement would particularly affect
the admissibility of statements by agents who are members of labor unions. If the janitor
is a union member, the owner might not be free to fire him without cause, and thus the
janitor's concern for his job security would be substantially reduced. Professor Boyce
has acknowledged the legitimacy of this concern by those who favor retention of the
"speaking agent" requirement. Boyce, supra note 3, at 324.
58. If the court decides to adopt the proposed rules, it should consider deleting part
(D) of Rule 801(d)(2) because it seems to restate the rule embodied in part (C). Accord-
ing to Judge Weinstein, 80 1(d)(2)(C) is merely a formulation of the traditional "speak-
ing agent" rule. 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 3, V 801(d)(2)(C)[01], at 801-126 (1977). The
Judicial Council indicated, however, that Rule 801(d)(2)(D) of the proposed rules was
drafted to express Washington's traditional "speaking agent" rule. PROPOSED WASH. R.
EvID. 801 Comment 801, Paragraph (d). If the court construes part (C) as Judge Wein-
stein does, then (C) and (D) should be combined into a single subparagraph.
59. Washington's present declarations-against-interest exception admits only state-
ments that are against the declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest. Allen v. Dil-
lard, 15 Wn. 2d 35, 55, 129 P.2d 813, 822 (1942). Federal Rule 804(b)(3), the adoption
of which has been recommended by the Washington Judicial Council, admits statements
which tend to expose the declarant to criminal or civil liability generally, including tort
liability. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3), Advisory Comm. Note.
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missible against the principal if the agent were unavailable to testify. 60
Had the janitor admitted to the injured customer that the janitor's
own negligence in failing to mop the floor was the cause of the
customer's fall, the agent would have exposed himself to personal lia-
bility and exposed the owner to imputed liability. Were the janitor
unavailable to testify in the customer's action against the owner, the
customer could introduce the agent's out-of-court statment as a state-
ment against interest. Thus, admissibility of the statement would not
depend on the janitor's authority to speak.
In cases in which the agent was available or the statement exposed
only the principal to liability, the court would still be required to draw
the line between implied authority to speak and absence of such au-
thority. For example, had the janitor proclaimed that he had tried to
mop up the water but the owner had refused to buy mops which were
adequate for the job, the statement would not be within the declara-
tion-against-interest exception since it would not expose the speaker
to civil or criminal liability. The statement's admissibility, then,
would depend on the court's willingness to find that the janitor had
implied authority to speak on behalf of the owner. Similarly, were the
declarant available to testify but the customer nonetheless wished to
introduce the out-of-court statement, the declaration-against-interest
exception would not apply and the court's determination of the im-
plied agency issue would decide the statement's admissibility. Conse-
quently, if the Washington Supreme Court adopts the broad state-
ment-against-interest exception, then, in examining the relative merits
of the broad and the common law vicarious admissions rules, the
court need only concern itself with those statements by "non-speaking
agents" that either expose only the principal to liability or are made
by agents who are available to testify at trial.
As discussed in Parts IV and V, the distinction between "speaking"
and "non-speaking" agency creates certain practical inconsistencies
with the substantive law of vicarious liability6' but has some basis in
60. Federal Rule 804(b)(3) (statement against interest) permits admission of
[a] statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or
criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a rea-
sonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed
it to be true.
FED. R. EvIo. 804(b)(3). This exception applies only when the declarant is unavailable
to testify.
61. See Part IV-B supra.
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fairness and reliability.62 Yet even the distinction's furtherance of
these latter two rationales is imprecise and based on debatable as-
sumptions about the nature of the principal-agent relationship. 63
Statements by "non-speaking agents" that do not expose the agent to
liability are in some circumstances reliable and in others not.64
Present Washington law generally excludes such statements.65 Federal
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) generally admits them.66 Even much of the evi-
dence admitted under the common law rule, criticized as too narrow,
has none of the recognized indicia of trustworthiness. 67
VII. PROPOSED RULE
The debate over the comparative values of the broad and common
law rules has apparently reached an impasse. Although proponents of
the broad rule generally acknowledge the legitimacy of concerns
about the rule's doubtful assurances of trustworthiness, they assert
that "non-speaking agents" more often than not speak with their prin-
cipals' interests at heart.68 The primary guarantee of reliability under
either vicarious admissions exception is the against-interest aspect
which often functions when an agent makes a statement adverse to his
principal. 69 Those who favor retention of the speaking agency re-
quirement typically pose a set of circumstances in which a "non-
speaking agent," who does not identify with his principal's interest,
62. See Parts V-A and V-C supra.
63. See Part IV-C supra.
64. The most important factor in the reliability of an agent's statement, regardless
of the agent's speaking authority, will often be the statement's self-exculpatory nature.
For example, the janitor's acknowledgement that his own negligence caused the cus-
tomer's injury might expose the declarant to a loss through civil liability far greater than
the loss of his job as floor sweeper. His claim that the cause of the accident was the
owner's refusal to invest in an adequate mop, while exposing the declarant to possible
dismissal, might, in the light of competing interests, be self-serving.
65. See Part II supra.
66. See Part III supra.
67. Inquiry under the common law rule is limited to the existence of speaking au-
thority. The agent's statement may be self-serving or the product of an animus against
his principal but nevertheless be admissible. Even the store manager, who clearly has
authority to speak for the owner, may have a greater fear of the civil or criminal conse-
quences of admitting personal fault than of losing her job as a result of diverting liabil-
ity to the store owner.
68. See note 48 supra.
69. See note 49 supra.
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makes an irresponsible statement.70 For example, if the janitor hates
his boss and his job, or because of union membership does not fear
dismissal, and makes a statement diverting any blame from himself to
the store owner, the statement satisfies no recognized test of reliabil-
ity. Those who criticize the broad rule on reliability grounds, how-
ever, typically fail to recognize that the same criticism can be leveled
against the traditional "speaking agent" rule. The store manager may
be willing to make a false statement which exposes the owner to liabil-
ity, and thus jeopardizes the manager's job, when she perceives the
civil or criminal consequences of honestly admitting her own fault as
a more serious threat. Since both the broad and the common law rules
focus on the existence and scope of the agency relationship rather
than on the against-interest nature of a statement, neither rule effec-
tively accomplishes the purpose of admitting the maximum amount of
reliable evidence.
A rule could be modeled after the liberal statements-against-interest
rule, focusing its inquiry directly on those guarantees of reliability
which are only incidental attributes of the agency relationship. The
total elimination of fairness as a rationale for personal and vicarious
admissions has been urged, as has the total elimination of the admis-
sions exception itself.71 However, the intuitive fairness of calling upon
a litigant to explain his own inconsistent assertions is accepted so
widely that it may substitute for a more logical rationale.72 But since
admitting evidence based merely on fairness is not consistent with the
modern emphasis on trustworthiness, 73 it would seem appropriate to
limit the rationale to those circumstances in which the fairness is truly
self-evident-that is, to personal admissions.74 The admissibility of
70. See note 24 supra (discussion of Professor Falknor's hypothetical, in which the
statement is made by an experienced truck driver who is also a "careless, unreliable and
erratic talker"). The arguments against the broad rule are summarized in Boyce, supra
note 3, at 324.
71. Hetland, supra note 3.
72. See note 31 supra.
73. See note 44 supra. Boyce observes: "[T] he Uniform Rules change the basis of
the rule from one of substantive agency law to one of evidence based upon the likeli-
hood of truth in the statement .... a thing the scholars have long called for." Boyce,
supra note 3, at 323.
74. The fairness rationale also applies, with substantial justification, to instances in
which a party has instructed a representative to make a particular statement, i.e., when
the party approves the content of the statement before it is made. In such a situation,
there is no need fictitiously to impute knowledge or consent to the principal. Conse-
quently, such a specifically authorized statement might well be left within the admis-
sions exception.
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statements by agents could be tested under the following hearsay ex-
ception:
A statement by an agent of the party against whom the statement is of-
fered is admissible if the statement concerned a matter within the
scope of the agent's authority and so far tended to jeopardize the
agent's employment relationship that a reasonable person, under cir-
cumstances similar to those which existed at the time the statement
was made, would not have made the statement unless it were true.75
VIII. THE OPERATION OF THE PROPOSED RULE
This rule has important advantages over either the federal or the
common law rule. Like the federal rule, it eliminates the doctrinal dis-
tortions and the uncertainties involved in an inquiry into the existence
of implied speaking authority.' 6 Any statement which concerns a mat-
ter within the scope of the declarant's agency would be potentially ad-
missible. More importantly, however, this proposed rule, unlike either
the federal or the common law rule, requires the court to inquire
directly into those circumstances which determine reliability.77
75. The rationale of this rule focuses on the declarant's perception of his own inter-
ests at the time the statement was made. As with the statement-against-interest
exception of the Federal Rules, this rationale would be more precisely effectuated by
the application of a subjective standard rather than the objective "reasonable person"
standard which it now incorporates. This proposed rule is drafted to be consistent with
the objective federal against-interest rule, and should the Washington Supreme Court
decide to adopt a subjective standard for the existing federal rule, the same standard
should certainly be incorporated in this proposed rule.
76. See Part II supra.
77. In explaining the Model Code's elimination of certain traditional bases of ad-
missibility, Professor Morgan stated:
There is no reason why a hearsay declaration of an available witness, which is self-
serving or which has no indicium of verity should be received against a party
merely because he happens to be in relation ofjoint obligor, or joint owner, or pre-
decessor in interest with the declarant.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508, comment (1942).
Professor Morgan's reasons for eliminating the joint-obligation and the joint-owner-
ship exceptions from the Model Code equally justify elimination of the vicarious admis-
sions exception. Statements by agents against their principals, like statements by onejoint tenant against another, tend to be reliable because they tend to be in some way
against the declarant's interest. Recognizing that property and contract law have no nec-
essary connection to reliability, Professor Morgan drafted the Model Code to admit
statements by joint obligors and joint tenants only if they qualified under the declara-
tions-against-interest exception. Although he retained the vicarious admissions excep-
tion, subsequent commentators have pointed out that Professor Morgan's reasoning
would require elimination of that exception as well. See, e.g., Falknor, supra note 3, at
856; Hetland, supra note 3, at 320.
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Excluded under this exception would be all those statements by
agents whose motives were self-serving or whose loyalty to their prin-
cipals or fear of discharge was so weak that the statement would not
be found reliable under the reasonable person test. For example, be-
fore admitting the statement by the store manager, the court would
examine the competing interests of the manager in the particular cir-
cumstances under which the statement was made. The owner could
oppose the admission of the manager's statement by introducing evi-
dence that the manager held an animus against her78 or feared being
sued. As with the present federal statement-against-interest rule, the
manager's statement would be admitted only if the court determined,
after balancing the competing interests, that a reasonable person
would not have made the statement unless it were true. The same in-
quiry would apply to the janitor's statement. The difference in inter-
ests resulting from the different types of jobs would be balanced as
one of the factors relevant to determining the against-interest nature
of the statement.
In most other respects, the proposed "statement-against-employ-
ment-interest" rule would function similarly to the federal vicarious
admissions rule.79 It would, however, be so similar in rationale and
application to the federal exception for statements against interest
that it would seem consistent with the scheme of the federal rules to
include it in Rule 804. Rule 804, unlike Rule 801, requires that the
declarant be unavailable to testify at trial. The requirement of un-
78. The manager's personal feelings toward the owner, while certainly significant in
determining the statement's reliability, might be difficult to incorporate into the objec-
tive standard of the proposed exception. This difficulty illustrates one of the advantages
of a subjective standard. See note 75 supra.
79. This "statement-against-employment-interest" exception retains the require-
ment of the federal rule that the statement concern a matter within the scope of the de-
clarant's agency, and thus retains that assurance of reliability which is based on the
declarant's particular familiarity with the subject matter of her declaration. The federal
rule's requirement that the agency still exist at the time of the declaration is implicit in
this test as one of the elements relevant to determining the significance of the threat to
the declarant's employment interest. Treating the nature of the employment relation-
ship at the time of the statement as a balancing factor rather than an unqualified re-
quirement has the advantage of allowing flexible analysis of statements made during pe-
riods of suspension or during other abridgments of the employment relationship short of
termination.
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availability depends upon whether the out-of-court statement is likely
to be more reliable than testimony given by the declarant at trial.80
For a statement to be admissible under the proposed rule, the state-
ment's proponent generally would have to establish that the agent felt
some identification with the principal's interest at the time the state-
ment was made.81 If the agency relationship still exists at the time of
trial, there would be reason to believe the agent could be susceptible
to the pressures of his principal. This contingency could be addressed
by an addition to the proposed rule to the following effect:
Where the agency still exists at the time of trial, the agent's unavaila-
bility is not required for the operation of the above exception.
IX. CONCLUSION
Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(D) and present Washington law share the
same fundamental flaw. Neither test inquires directly into those cir-
cumstances which produce trustworthiness. Both reliable and unreli-
ble statements may be admitted under either test, and no modification
in the type of agency required can remedy this difficulty. By changing
the focus of inquiry to the against-interest aspect of agents' admis-
sions, the proposed "statement-against-employment-interest" rule
eschews those dubious assumptions about the principal-agent rela-
tionship which form the basis of both vicarious admissions excep-
tions.
Norman B. Page
80. "When unavailability of the declarant is made a condition precedent to
admitting his hearsay statement, a rule of preference is in fact being stated. His personal
presence in court, under oath and subject to cross-examination, would be preferred." C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 253, at 608.
The absence of the unavailability requirement for vicarious admissions under the fed-
eral rules may be justified on the ground that the principal's pressure on the agent be-
tween the time of the statement and the time of trial would render the agent's testimony
at trial less reliable than her earlier out-of-court statement. This defense of the federal
rule depends on certain factual assumptions which may or may not be valid in a given
case. It is entirely possible that the agent may have been discharged between the time of
the statement and the time of trial, in which case there would be no reason to suppose
the agent's testimony would be distorted by pressures from her former principal.
81. As discussed in Part IV- C, this identification with the principal's interest could
result from a concern for job security or from a sense of loyalty.
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